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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents an analysis on 54 public European companies privatized 
between 1985 and 2009. The main purpose of the current dissertation is to examine 
whether privatizations by public companies led to a substantial improvement in their 
financial position. For our purpose, we use equality testing by comparing financial 
ratios surrounding the privatization year. Specifically, we utilize the t-student test 
and the Wilcoxon test for the total of the sample, in order to determine how the 
privatization process affected the economic performance of the privatized 
companies. The sample is divided in two subsets, one for the companies that have 
been privatized up to 50%, and one for the companies which have been privatized 
more than 50%. The empirical results on privatization appear to conclude that 
privatization leads to a more efficient distribution of services. 
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Section 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
Privatization is the transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector 
and has been on the top of the political discussions the past two decades and, 
especially after the post war period. 
One of the first privatizations in the recent history took place in Germany. 
Specifically, in 1961 the German government sold the majority shares to Volkswagen 
through a public offering. Furthermore, in the United Kingdom from 1979 and the 
advent of Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government privatizations had left their 
mark in the economic history of the last two decades. At first, the economists were 
very skeptical for the Margaret Thatcher’s programme but after a few years and 
because of the success of many privatization programmes, the conservative party 
gained great support and until 1997 almost all public firms were privatized 
(Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004). During the 1990s the privatization phenomenon 
had spread in developed and emerging economies.  
After the beginning of privatizations in the United Kingdom the governments 
started to concentrate on the benefits of privatization. The outcome was that many 
developing and developed governments allowed private initiatives in certain sectors 
of the economy. In Europe the phenomenon of privatization started as a 
liberalization movement and was adopted with different directives that set 
instructions for the privatization process in core sectors of the economy such as 
electricity, transportation and telecommunications. A transfer of ownership without 
improving the services and allowing competition affects very little the privatized 
firms’ performance (Kothenburger et al., 2006). 
The dissolution of the Former Soviet Union in 1991 gave a new motivation to 
the privatization process. The new economies which emerged after this period used 
privatization process as a means to create a market economy. In 1995 most 
countries in the Central and Eastern Europe had almost privatized the 50% of the 
state owned companies and had approximately employed 50% of their labour force 
in the private sector. However, privatization of large firms was accomplished later 
that period and by 2000 most of the large public firms were privatized. With this 
mass privatization process from small to large firms they were created numerous of 
job openings, as a result privatization led to economic reforms to emerging countries 
(Lieberman and Kopf, 2008). 
It is very difficult to define the actual implications of privatization. As a result 
various questions are generated from the privatization process: 
i. Whether companies’ profitability increases after the privatization process   
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ii. Whether companies’ output increases after the privatization process 
iii. Whether companies’ leverage decreases after the privatization process 
 
To answer these questions the privatization process is studied using 54 
companies privatized between 1985 and 2009 in 10 European countries.  The main 
purpose is to determine the consequences of privatization on firms' economic 
performance. 
The financial analysis aims to investigate the implementation of the privatization 
process on profitability, output and financial leverage of the companies taking into 
consideration fully and partially privatized firms, even though there is little empirical 
evidence on partial privatization. 
The rest of the analysis is organized as follows:  in section 2 literature review 
informs about the existing work already published, in section 3 the empirical 
evidence regarding privatization process is presented. In sections 4 and 5 the sample 
selection, methodology and variables are used for the discussion of the method the 
analysis was approached. In section 6 the results are discussed and finally in section 
7 discussion of the results is presented.    
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Section 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
I. Definition of Privatization  
Privatization is the procedure of transmitting ownership from a public company 
to a private, either to a company that functions for a profit or for a non-profit 
organization. According to Starr (1988) privatization involves any alteration of 
activities of a public company to the private sector and, more specifically, any 
alteration of the production of goods and services from public to private sector.  
Normally, privatization involves the sale of more than 50% of the shares to 
private investors. Nevertheless, the main clue is that the process of privatization 
improves the economy’s performance by encouraging competition (Beesley M. E., 
1997).  
Megginson (2000) argues that privatization characterizes an ideological pause 
with the history of state control to a country's productive assets, characterizes a 
pause from socialist state ownership. Privatization also describes the buying of all 
outstanding shares of a public company by a single unit, taking the company private.  
 
II. Characteristics of Privatization  
The large debate on privatization is the method the companies will be privatized. 
There are four main methods of privatization (Lieberman and Kopf, 2008): 
• Asset sale privatization is the sale of the entire company or part of it 
either to a group of investors or a strategic investor. 
• Share issue privatization (SIP) is the sale of shares on the stock market. 
• Voucher privatization is the allocation of shares of ownership to all 
citizens, usually for free or at a very low price. 
• Management or employee buyouts.   
 
Through an asset sale, the government sells shares of the public company to 
a private company or to a group of investors. Asset sales occur more often in 
developing countries because higher political and currency risk discourages foreign 
investors. An important advantage of asset sale privatizations is that the buyers 
prefer to offer the highest price. As a consequence they produce revenues for the 
government except for tax revenues.  
In share issue privatizations, the government sells shares in the stock market 
to private and institutional investors. SIPs are considered the most economically 
important methods of privatizations. Share issues can develop domestic capital 
markets, enhancing liquidity and economic growth, but if the stock markets are 
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inadequately developed it may be difficult for buyers to be found and transaction 
costs may be high (Megginson et al., 2004). 
Voucher privatizations are comparable to SIPs. In this privatization method 
the government allocates shares of ownership to each citizen which are called 
vouchers. Vouchers are paper titles that can be exchanged for ownership in previous 
public companies (Megginson et al., 2004). Voucher privatization arose in the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe generating for the citizens a feeling of 
participation in the domestic economy. If this allocation of vouchers is allowed, a 
market could be created, with companies offering to pay cash for them.   
Management buyout (MBO) is a method of privatization where a company's 
managers acquire a great portion or all of the company from either the parent 
company or from the private owners. Likewise employees can buy the majority 
shares in their own company. This method of buyout is frequently used by 
companies that search for a different method to a leveraged buyout (LBO). The 
companies which are sold can be profitable companies or companies facing financial 
problems (Lieberman and Kopf, 2008). 
There are different factors that influence the choice of privatization method such 
as the capital market, the political characteristics of each country and firm-specific 
factors. 
 
III. The role of financial market  
The method a government privatizes a state owned enterprise (SOE) is affected 
by the degree of development of the privatizing country’s stock market. If the 
national stock market is relatively premature, it is hard for share issue privatizations 
to be effective, mostly because it is difficult to find buyers. 
For instance, if a liquid stock market is efficient when privatizations arise it will 
favour the concentration of big issues increasing the likelihood of privatization of 
large public monopolies (Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004). Bortolotti et al. (2006) 
agree that stock market liquidity is also improved by share issue privatizations.  
 
IV. Political characteristics 
Privatization occasionally is regarded as either an ideological choice or the 
outcome of low performance of public companies. For example, in Great Britain the 
Thatcher administration had promised to free the markets that were publicly 
controlled and the main solution was their privatization (Parker and Saal, 2003). 
Ramamurti (2000) argues that privatization is a political rather than economic 
decision. It is largely accepted that governments are supported by liberal and 
conservative political parties. Except for these ideological reasons the beginning of 
macroeconomic crises has driven governments toward privatization. 
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V. Firm-Specific Characteristics 
Also, the decision of privatization technique is influenced by issues similar to 
those faced by a company that needs to choose whether to use the public or private 
stock markets to raise capital (Megginson et al. 2004). Similarly to private companies 
looking for external funding, the policy makers need to consider the value of the 
public company before choosing the privatization technique. 
 
VI. Privatization in transition economies 
Privatization is a worldwide phenomenon. Initially, it took place in industrialized 
economies and it has spread to the former socialist countries and to low income 
developing countries. Privatization was important for the reforms that had taken 
place in transition economies and it was important for the formation of a market 
economy. The key reason as to why privatization was so significant to developing 
and transition countries is the debt crisis which appeared in 1981-1982 (Lieberman 
and Kopf, (2008).  In the case of many of these economies their external debt 
problem led them to a decade of low or negative growth and macro-economic 
uncertainty (Giersch, 1997). Public companies in many of these closed economies 
were characterized by:  
• low or negative economic growth, 
• redundant staff, 
• necessity for subsidies and individual money transfers, 
• extremely centralized organizations, 
• elimination of national competitors, 
• low exports, 
• corrupt technics. 
Moreover, as SOEs had formed monopolies, their poor performance indicated 
that the private sector could not be competitive, principally in a secure market. In 
the mid- 1980s, a lot of countries, wanted to restructure their large SOEs mostly over 
changes in their management and operation. However, it became obvious that the 
privatization process was inevitable and difficult. In transition economies 
privatization had three objectives: (Lieberman and Kopf, 2008).   
 Strengthening the market by encouraging competition. 
 Producing new sources of income and financing for companies, not only 
through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI).  
 Decreasing fiscal deficits by using privatization profits to reduce external and 
domestic debt and collecting tax revenues from profits of privatized 
companies.  
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Section 3 
 
Empirical Evidence regarding privatization process 
 
I. Government ownership and firm performance 
The phenomenon of privatizations has produced large empirical literature 
regarding the effect of ownership on firm performance. A lot of studies indicate that 
privatization has a positive impact on the profitability and efficiency of firms. 
Sun et al. (2002) explain the topic of privatization using China's privatization process. 
They study whether government ownership affects the performance of China's SOEs 
in the privatization process. The Chinese privatization process is important to 
present the complexity of privatization because China is now the largest centrally 
planned communist country after the end of the former USSR. The result is that 
government ownership and firm performance are positively related. When an SOE 
begins selling a small portion of shares to the public, the firm's performance 
improves. After a certain level, increased selling of government shares to the public 
results in a poorer firm performance. Partial government ownership has a positive 
impact on SOE performance. However, this does not mean that the government 
should not privatize the SOEs at all.  
In the same region of research, Donghui, et al. (2007), study the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance for Chinese public companies 
privatized the period 1992–2000. The results also suggest that managerial ownership 
improves firm performance. Even though return on assets (ROA) and return on sales 
(ROS) decline after privatization, firms with high managerial ownership have a 
smaller decrease. Also, the authors found that firm performance has a smaller 
decrease at high levels of CEO ownership. On the other hand, performance 
continues to rise with managerial ownership. This fact indicates that, after a certain 
level, the allocation of shares would be more effective if distributed to the whole 
management team.  
Mohieldina and Nasr (2007) discuss the privatization of the banking sector in 
Egypt. They indicate the structure and the measures undertaken by the Egyptian 
authorities for the past decades. The authors measure the performance of the public 
banks as opposed to private banks for the period 1995–2005. The indicators 
profitability, capital adequacy, earnings and asset quality show that state-owned 
banks are not so efficient compared to private banks. The results also show that 
retaining government ownership can negatively affect banks performance.  
Also, D’sousa and Megginson (1999) found that privatization yields significant 
performance improvements. They compare the pre and post privatization financial 
and operating performance of 85 companies from 28 industrialized countries that 
were privatized with the method of public share offerings for the period from 1990 
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to 1996. The authors found considerable rise in profitability and operating efficiency 
and considerable decline in leverage ratios for the sample of companies after 
privatization. Furthermore capital expenditures grow considerably but not in relation 
to sales.  
Frydman et al. (1999) compare the performance of privatized and public 
companies in the transition economies in Central Europe. Privatization has diverse 
effects that depend on the categories of the owners. When privatization is efficient, 
there is positive effect on revenues, but there is no similar effect on cost reduction. 
Furthermore, privatization leads to employment losses after privatization process. In 
transition economies in Central Europe, privatization improves revenues and 
productivity of companies that will be privatized by outsider-owners, however it 
does not have considerable implications in firms that are privatized by insiders. 
These findings indicate that different types of owners may have different implication 
on companies’ performance.  
 
 
II. Privatized firms’ performance 
 
Privatization has presented a positive result on the performance of privatized 
companies. One argument in favour of the privatization of public companies is the 
expected increase in efficiency that can arise from private ownership. This expected 
efficiency is a consequence of the greater importance private owners put on profit 
increase contrary to the government, which is less concerned about the profits 
maximization.  
More specifically, García and Ansón, (2007) analyse the key features of the 
Spanish privatization processes and its significance for the performance of privatized 
companies during the period 1985–2000. The comparison of the pre and post 
privatization period does not show significant improvements in privatized 
companies’ profitability for a medium-term period. Instead, it is found significant 
improvements in privatized companies’ profitability and efficiency over a long-term 
period. The results also indicate that privatized companies may need more time to 
beat their industry counterparts. Yet, it cannot be confirmed an improvement in 
investment and in leverage once testing for industry levels. It is also found that the 
economic environment and prior reforms have a significant impact on the results of 
privatization. 
Similarly, Ariff et al. (2009) examine the post-privatization performance of SOEs 
and its significance. The authors examine a sample of telecommunications 
companies from 40 countries for the years 1989-1998 using indicators pre and post 
privatization. Also the authors measure the firms’ performance in terms of both 
financial and production efficiency and they find that privatization results in 
improvement in financial and production performance.  
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The same results indicate Boubakri and Cosset (1998) who study the financial 
and operating performance of 79 privatized companies from developing countries. 
The authors examine full and partial privatization during the period 1980-1992. 
Using accounting data they find considerable improvement in profitability, operating 
efficiency, output, investments, employment and dividends after the privatization 
period. Moreover, they find improvement in leverage but this adjustment is 
important for unadjusted leverage ratios 
In Hsueh-liang Wu and Parker (2009) study the productivity implications of 
labour in the pre and post privatization period using a sample of firms privatized in 
Taiwan between 1989 and 2002. In this study the companies’ performance is 
examined in relation to the average performance of other firms in the same industry 
and in the same period. The authors also study the implications of competition and 
the presence of government selected board members on companies’ performance. 
The findings indicate that competition improves productivity but, the continued 
majority government representation on boards does not have important effect on 
labour productivity. On the other hand it is found a relationship between financial 
performance under state control and increases in productivity after privatization.  
Claessens and Djankov (2002) indicate changes in the performance of 6,000 
privatized and public manufacturing companies in seven Eastern European countries 
for the early transition period. The authors conclude that privatization is connected 
with improvement in sales and labour productivity, and with fewer job losses. These 
improvements are apparent in a long term horizon. For example, companies 
privatized for less than 2 years have labor productivity development analogous to 
that of public companies. On the other hand, companies privatized for longer period 
outperform public companies.  
Otchere and Zhang (2001) analyse the performance of 23 privatized firms in 
China and 51 rivals privatized from 1992 to 1998 they find that competitors 
responded negatively to the privatization announcements. The results indicate that 
privatized companies in China are considered more competitive and the competitors 
react negatively to the announcements. Moreover, the authors study the long-term 
stock market performance of the privatized companies compared with that of the 
competitors and find that the privatized firms have a better performance from their 
competitors after the third year of privatization. While most of the companies are 
partially privatized, the authors do not find any indication that the proportion of 
privatization is closely related with the returns of the privatized companies. 
Dinic and Gupta (2011) study the effect of political and financial features on the 
privatization decision of public companies. The authors show that gainful companies 
and companies with a lower wage bill are expected to be privatized early. Also, it is 
found that the government postpones privatization in areas where the government 
faces more competition from other parties.  
 
 
Firms’ performance pre and post privatization  14 
III. Privatization methods 
 
The method used from a company to privatize its shares is affected from firm 
specific as well as industry specific factors.  
For example, Gupta (2005) specifies that most privatization processes begin with 
a period of partial privatization. In this case not all shares of the company are sold on 
the stock market. Management control is not transferred to private owners and for 
this reason it is assumed that partial privatization does not influence firms’ 
performance. However, using accounting data from 1990 to 2002 of Indian public 
companies it is found that partial privatization influence positively the profitability 
and productivity of the companies. The technique of partial privatization is not used 
a lot as being unsuccessful. The stocks of the company are traded on the stock 
market whereas the firm is controlled by the government. Also, the author indicates 
that in full privatization it is difficult to separate the political and the managerial 
practices as ownership and control change to the private sector at the same time.  
Furthermore, SIPs occur more frequently in less developed capital markets, for 
more gainful public companies, and where there is protection on smaller 
shareholders. Asset sales are more often when there is less government control in a 
country’s economy and when the privatized company is relatively small. The results 
specify that the privatization process develops the stock markets of the privatizing 
countries. The type of the capital market in the privatizing country affects the 
decision to privatize. For example, SIPs more often arise in countries with less 
developed capital markets. This fact can be a result of the government’s need to use 
SIPs in order to develop the domestic market’s liquidity (Megginson et al. 2004). 
In the same study the authors indicate that a country’s financing decisions are 
influenced by the political and legal environment of each privatizing country. 
Moreover, asset sales are used mainly by governments that have less state control of 
the economy. As stated earlier, the privatization method is influenced by firm-
specific characteristics, such as the size of the offering and the profitability of the 
public company. For instance large offerings and more lucrative public companies 
are about to be privatized using the public capital markets and SIPs. Large offerings 
are easily absorbed by current public capital markets and except of that they attract 
more possible investors. 
Equally to the previous research, Bortolotti et al. (2006) agrees that SIPs helped 
to develop stock market liquidity in 19 developed countries. Specifically, it is found 
that privatization IPOs have a negative result on the price which is calculated by the 
ratio of the market index to turnover. Also, the authors found that liquidity is 
improved by SIPs, something that it is claimed by privatizing governments.  
However, Omran (2005) suggests in his analysis that SIPs outperform the 
market in bull periods and then underperform the market in bear periods. He studies 
the impact of initial public offerings (IPOs) for 53 share issue privatizations in Egypt 
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between 1994 and 1998. In this period, it is found that share issue privatizations 
improve their performance and investors gain revenues over a short term horizon, 
however, the results indicate negative revenues over longer horizon of three to five 
years. 
The research of Jelic et al. (2003) is focused on examining the privatization 
procedure by comparing the different policies employed by Hungary, Poland and 
Czech Republic and the financial performance of the privatized firms. The results 
indicate improvement in revenues in all countries. For instance, investors who 
invested in Polish, Hungarian and Czech privatized companies at their first trading 
day and kept these shares for a period of three years could have gained positive 
returns. However, the newly privatized companies in Poland significantly outperform 
its counterparts while their Hungarian and Czech companies accomplish positive, but 
not statistically significant returns. 
Atanasov (2005) examines the development of the Bulgarian stock market 
and the significance of majority stock holders. They are used mass privatization data 
to calculate the premium for control and reveal that, majority shareholders earn 
more than 85% of value as premium of control. After the privatization process and 
the start of their trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, the public companies 
trade at almost 60% discounts. 
Boubakri and Hamza (2007) study the circumstances privatization can be 
efficient for the development of stock markets for 61 economies for the period 
1980–1998. By studying the privatization process and stock market development, it 
is found that the initial legal environment is an important factor for the development 
of the stock market. These results indicate that stock market regulation is significant 
for its development since, it will generate substantial profits for the local stock 
market, and it will generate economic growth in the long run.  
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Section 4 
 
Sample selection  
 
The sample used to perform the financial analysis has been drawn from 
Bloomberg and Privatization Barometer. More precisely the initial sample consisted 
of 75 European companies. Due to limitations in the selection of financial data for 
the pre privatization period the final sample consists of 54 public European 
companies privatized between 1983 and 2008. Data on companies’ balance sheets 
and income statements as well as financial ratios for two years before and two years 
after privatization were also collected from Bloomberg. 
The companies belong to different sectors. The majority of the companies 
belong to transportation industry (24%), telecommunications (15%), manufacturing 
(15%), finance (15%), petroleum (13%), utilities (13%) and finally the other 5% is 
occupied by the service sector.  
 
 
Table 1: Sample distribution by country, sector and method of sale 
Privatization 
Year* 
Company Name Country Sector 
Method of 
Sale 
1983 British Petroleum Co PLC United Kingdom Petroleum Industry PO 
1984 British Telecommunications PLC United Kingdom Telecommunications PO 
1987 OMV AG Austria Petroleum Industry PO 
1987 Telefonica de Espana SA Spain Telecommunications PO 
1988 Outokumpu Finland Manufacturing PO 
1988 
ENDESA (Empresa Nacional de 
Electricidad SA) 
Spain Utilities PO 
1989 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Germany 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
1989 Repsol SA Spain Petroleum Industry PO 
1989 SSAB (Svenskt Stal AB) Sweden Manufacturing PO 
1992 Flughafen Wien AG Austria 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
1994 Kemira Finland Manufacturing PO 
1994 Renault SA France Manufacturing PO 
1994 Kobenhavns Lufthavne  Germany 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
1995 Voestalpine AG Austria Manufacturing PO 
1995 Finnair Finland 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
1995 Neste Oil Finland Petroleum Industry PO 
1995 ENI Italy Petroleum Industry PO 
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1995 Indra Sistemas SA Spain Manufacturing PS 
1996 Deutsche Telekom AG Germany Telecommunications PO 
1996 Belgacom SA Belgium Telecommunications PS 
1996 OTE (Hellenic Telecom Organization) Greece Telecommunications PO 
1996 Gas Natural SDG SA Spain Utilities PO 
1997 Telecom Italia SpA Italy Telecommunications PO 
1998 Telekom Austria AG Austria Telecommunications PS 
1998 Fortum Finland Petroleum Industry PO 
1998 Sponda Finland 
Finance & Real 
Estate Industry 
PO 
1998 Hellenic Petroleum Greece Petroleum Industry PO 
1998 National Bank of Greece SA Greece 
Finance & Real 
Estate Industry 
PO 
1999 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy 
Finance & Real 
Estate Industry 
PO 
1999 Enel Italy Utilities PO 
1999 Red Electrica de Espana SA Spain Utilities PO 
1999 Saab Factory Malmoe Sweden 
Finance & Real 
Estate Industry 
PS 
2000 Deutsche Post AG Germany 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
2000 Agricultural Bank of Greece Greece 
Finance & Real 
Estate Industry 
PO 
2000 Aeroporto di Firenze SpA Italy 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
2001 Fraport AG Germany 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
2001 Thessaloniki Port Authority Greece 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
2001 Opap Greece Services Industry PO 
2001 Public Power Corporation SA Greece Utilities PO 
2002 Stora Enso Finland Manufacturing PO 
2003 Dassault Systemes France Services Industry PO 
2004 Sampo Finland 
Finance & Real 
Estate Industry 
PS 
2004 Air France - KLM France 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
2004 Deutsche Postbank AG Germany 
Finance & Real 
Estate Industry 
PO 
2004 Aeroporto di Venezia Italy 
Transportation 
Industry 
PS 
2005 Gaz de France France Utilities PO 
2005 Rezidor Hotel Group AB (SAS) Sweden Services Industry PS 
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2006 Finnlines Oyj Finland 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
2006 ICADE SA France 
Finance & Real 
Estate Industry 
PO 
2007 Beiersdorf AG Germany Manufacturing PO 
2007 Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG Germany 
Transportation 
Industry 
PO 
2007 TeliaSonera Sweden Telecommunications PO 
2008 Aeroports de Paris France 
Transportation 
Industry 
PS 
2008 Suez Environment France Utilities PO 
 
Source: Own research 
*First privatization year 
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Section 5 
 
Methodology and Variables Employed 
 
Consistent with the literature review presented and the research questions, 
the study aims to determine whether privatization held on public companies, led in a 
substantial improvement in their financial position. This is achieved, by 
strengthening their profitability, sales and efficiency and restricting their leverage at 
the same time. Following García and Ansón, (2007) and D'Souza and Megginson 
(1999), the sample is divided in two groups for the analysis: The first group includes 
measures of the companies’ economic position, concerning the two year period, 
before privatization. The second group refers to the two years following the year of 
privatization. Afterwards, this sample is divided in two subsets, one for the 
companies that have been privatized up to 50%, and one for the companies which 
have been privatized more than 50%. 
Since the main purpose of the study is to test whether the economic impact 
of privatized companies has changed after the privatization period, they are 
examined the same variables used as García and Ansón, (2007), D'Souza and 
Megginson (1999) and Gupta (2005). Specifically, the analysis is focused on Total 
Assets, Sales, and Net Profit. Also a variety of ratios is calculated such as, ROA, ROE, 
Profit Margin, Operating Margin, Debt to Total Assets, and Financial Leverage. These 
indicators measure the financial position of a company and they strongly establish 
criteria for predicting the changes occur in a company due to the privatization 
process. 
Profitability is measured by calculating the Return on Assets and the Return 
on Equity. Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated as the ratio of company’s net income 
to total assets and indicates how profitable a company is in relation to its assets.  
Return on Equity (ROE) is calculated by dividing the net income of a company 
by shareholders’ equity. The purpose of the ratio is to record the degree to which 
the shareholders are rewarded for their investment. A high value of ROA indicates 
both that the investors are well-remunerated for their investment and that the 
directors of the company utilize the amount of money invested in the company 
effectively. 
 Profit Margin is the percentage calculated by dividing Net Profit to Revenue 
and depicts the proportion of the selling price that became profit. Obviously high 
sales do not necessarily imply high earnings. Consequently, it is chosen the use of 
profit margin even though Sales and Net Profit are included in the research.  
Operating Margin or Return on Sales (ROS) is calculated by dividing the 
operating income, which is the net income before interests and taxes by its sales. It 
is most commonly recorded as a percentage.  
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Liquidity explains the degree to which a company corresponds to its short-
term obligations. Debt to Total Assets is a representative index. The ratio indicates 
the financial risk held by the company and assesses what level of its total assets is 
financed by debt. As the ratio increases, a company faces financial inflexibility. 
Moreover, another indicator is leverage which is the amount of debt a 
company uses to finance its assets. The analysis is focused on financial leverage 
which is calculated as the ratio of ROE to ROA or in other words as the total assets of 
the company divided by its total shareholders’ equity. A firm with significantly more 
debt than equity is considered to be highly leveraged. 
Finally, Total Assets is necessary to be included in the estimates, as they 
represent both the company’s property and also the means it has available to 
generate sales and therefore profits.  
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics as they are calculated for the 
entire sample, table 2A summarizes the results for the companies privatized up 50%, 
and 2B summarizes the results for companies privatized for a level above 50%. 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
TOTALASSETS_A 54 66,947.887 276,992.642 59.325 2,034,866.500 
ROA_A 54 11.792 14.815 -0.070 106.690 
ROE_A 54 16.237 14.629 -2.735 103.530 
NETPROFIT_A 54 920.085 1,274.636 -152.500 5,089.000 
PROFITMARGIN_A 54 10.107 7.587 -0.270 34.105 
OPERATINGMARGIN_A 54 15.780 10.116 2.085 45.385 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_A 54 26.618 15.809 0.000 58.190 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_A 54 5.067 6.826 1.175 39.825 
SALES_A 54 13,438.973 19,665.429 36.245 82,193.000 
TOTALASSETS_B 54 60,871.772 286,279.072 44.465 2,111,386.000 
ROA_B 54 10.169 12.218 -8.990 82.420 
ROE_B 54 15.522 18.165 -27.455 112.300 
NETPROFIT_B 54 806.631 1,446.107 -2015.000 6,474.000 
PROFITMARGIN_B 54 8.727 8.334 -16.315 35.960 
OPERATINGMARGIN_B 54 14.757 10.525 -3.085 48.225 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_B 54 29.072 17.326 0.000 76.315 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_B 54 5.949 8.804 1.095 56.985 
SALES_B 54 11,402.539 16,456.469 29.505 75,325.500 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
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Table  3: Descriptive statistics(<50%) 
Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
TOTALASSETS_A 54 25,846.895 35,407.879 111.020 121,906.500 
ROA_A 54 9.066 6.653 1.100 24.720 
ROE_A 54 13.928 7.850 2.450 29.870 
NETPROFIT_A 54 553.770 539.015 2.830 1,877.310 
PROFITMARGIN_A 54 10.760 7.271 1.655 27.465 
OPERATINGMARGIN_A 54 17.242 10.165 3.630 45.385 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_A 54 28.216 15.621 0.000 56.635 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_A 54 4.939 5.665 1.175 22.760 
SALES_A 54 12,617.018 16,513.221 36.245 54,258.500 
TOTALASSETS_B 54 21,801.927 33,385.389 95.660 126,879.000 
ROA_B 54 8.287 8.025 -4.370 32.470 
ROE_B 54 12.965 13.395 -16.060 59.355 
NETPROFIT_B 54 351.664 900.807 -2015.000 3,591.000 
PROFITMARGIN_B 54 9.087 6.623 -6.385 22.155 
OPERATINGMARGIN_B 54 16.402 9.040 0.620 41.900 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_B 54 32.241 17.378 0.000 58.780 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_B 54 6.067 6.612 1.095 25.170 
SALES_B 54 7,414.569 12,637.384 43.025 58,478.500 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
 
Table  4: Descriptive statistics (>50%) 
Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
TOTALASSETS_A 54 102,379.777 375,960.308 59.325 2034,866.500 
ROA_A 54 14.143 19.109 -0.070 106.690 
ROE_A 54 18.229 18.530 -2.735 103.530 
NETPROFIT_A 54 1,235.874 1,613.442 -152.500 5,089.000 
PROFITMARGIN_A 54 9.543 7.933 -0.270 34.105 
OPERATINGMARGIN_A 54 14.520 10.080 2.085 39.750 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_A 54 25.239 16.114 0.195 58.190 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_A 54 5.177 7.788 1.405 39.825 
SALES_A 54 14,147.556 22,297.274 252.535 82,193.000 
TOTALASSETS_B 54 94,552.673 389,406.299 44.465 2,111,386.000 
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ROA_B 54 11.791 14.882 -8.990 82.420 
ROE_B 54 17.727 21.445 -27.455 112.300 
NETPROFIT_B 54 1,198.843 1,708.426 -168.495 6,474.000 
PROFITMARGIN_B 54 8.416 9.678 -16.315 35.960 
OPERATINGMARGIN_B 54 13.339 11.625 -3.085 48.225 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_B 54 26.339 17.107 0.245 76.315 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_B 54 5.848 10.451 1.370 56.985 
SALES_B 54 14,840.445 18,689.165 29.505 75,325.500 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
 The following table includes the ratios used in the analysis, and the predicted 
outcome before and after the privatization process: 
 
Table 5: Predictions about variables used surrounding privatizations 
Variables Description  Predicted 
Relation 
Profitability   
ROA Operating profits divided by total assets ROAA> ROAB 
ROE Net profit divided by total equity  ROEA> ROEB 
ROS (op. margin) Operating profits divided by sales ROSA> ROSB 
Profit Margin Net Profit divided by sales PMA>PMB 
Output   
Sales Sales account SALESA> SALESB 
Net Profit Sales – total costs NPA>NPB 
Total Assets Total Assets sum TAA>TAB 
Solvency-Liquidity   
Debt to Total 
Assets 
Long and short term liabilities to total 
assets 
DTAA<DTAB 
Leverage   
Financial Leverage total assets divided by total equity LEVA<LEVB 
 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
     
After gathering and computing all necessary figures, the mean and the 
median for the two periods are calculated before and after privatization. The “year 
zero” is the year the privatization took place and it is not a part of the research since 
it refers to both the pre-privatization period and the post-privatization period. 
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Apparently, this specific year cannot be used to draw specific conclusions, 
concerning the company’s financial position.  
   It is used the t-test statistic, for two paired samples. The t-test supposes the 
existence of a Student's t distribution, as long as the null hypothesis exists. In the 
case in which the null hypothesis is rejected, a Student’s distribution does not exist. 
The null hypothesis is that the two data sets have equal means. In this particular 
case, it means that the mean values of the sample are the same before and after 
privatization, showing that it did not affect their financial position. 
Wilcoxon test is also used, which tests the difference of the medians of two 
data sets. The main difference from t-test, is that Wilcoxon test is applied to data 
sets, when the normal distribution is not accepted.  Wilcoxon test is an alternative to 
t-test. 
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Section 6 
 
Results 
 
At the beginning, the tests are conducted for the total of the sample, in order 
to determine how the privatization process affected all the companies. After that, 
the sample is divided in two subsets, one for the companies that have been 
privatized up to 50%, and one for the companies which have been privatized more 
than 50%. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the level of 
privatization plays a significant role in the financial position of each company.   
In the tables below the mean, the mode, and their difference, for each 
variable are presented, just as it is recorded for the pre and post privatization period. 
They are also summarized the findings for the t-student and the Wilcoxon test. 
 
Table 6: Sample Statistics 
Paired Samples Statistics  
  Mean Mode Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pair 1 TOTALASSETS_A       66,947.887        59.325 276,992.642 37,693.924 
TOTALASSETS_B          60,871.772           44.465    286,279.072    38,957.647    
  DIFFERENCES           6,07.,115         14.860        
Pair 2 ROA_A                  1.,792    -0.070             14.815              2.016    
ROA_B                  10.169               5.880            12.218              1.663    
  DIFFERENCES                 1.624    -5.950        
Pair 3 ROE_A                  16.237    -2.735             14.629              1.991    
ROE_B                  15.522    -27.455             18.165              2.472    
  DIFFERENCES                    0.715            24.720        
Pair 4 NETPROFIT_A                920.085      1,311.500       1,274.636         173.456    
NETPROFIT_B                806.631    -2,015.000  1,446.107         196.790    
  DIFFERENCES                113.454       3,326.500        
Pair 5 PROFITMARGIN_A                  10.107    -0.270             7.587              1.033    
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PROFITMARGIN_B                    8.727    -16.315               8.334              1.134    
  DIFFERENCES                    1.380            16.045        
Pair 6 OPERATINGMARGI
N_A 
                 15.780              2.085             10.116              1.377    
OPERATINGMARGI
N_B 
                 14.757    -3.085             10.525              1.432    
  DIFFERENCES                      1.023               5.170        
Pair 7 DEBTTOTOTALASSE
TS_A 
                26.618             0.000                 15.809              2.151    
DEBTTOTOTALASSE
TS_B 
                   29.072                0.000                17.326               2.358    
  DIFFERENCES -2.454             0.000           
Pair 8 FINANCIALLEVERAG
E_A 
                     5.067                        
2.435    
        6.826              0.929    
FINANCIALLEVERAG
E_B 
                  5.949              2.425               8.804              1.198    
  DIFFERENCES -0.882              0.010        
Pair 9 SALES_A    13,438.973  36.245  19,665.429    2,676.126    
SALES_B         11,402.539           29.505  16,456.469      2,239.442    
  DIFFERENCES          2,036.434              6.740        
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
 In Table 6, the level of total assets increased, after the privatization process, 
resulting in about 11% average growth, in only two years. Moreover, the 
privatization affected ROA, which increased by about 14% between the pre and post 
privatization period. The same is reflected on ROA which also increased by 4.5%. 
What is of high significance is that the net profit increased to a very considerable 
level, namely by 14%.  The level of Profit margin which was 16 %, increased to 21%, 
confirming the overall positive trend captured by the statistics. The operating margin 
increased also to a level of 7%. The augmented margin most probably was based on 
the enhanced sales, which rose by almost 18%. Debt to total assets decreased by 8%. 
Finally, financial leverage also decreased by about 15%. So far, the results answer 
the initial questions that profitability and output increase whereas financial leverage 
decreases.  
 In the following tables (7 and 8) the same statistical values are presented. 
Table 7 refers to companies with privatization level below or equal to 50%, and the 
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second one refers to privatization level more than 50%. The first sample consists of 
25 companies, and the second of 29. 
 
Table 7: Statistics (<50%) 
Paired Samples Statistics 
  Mean Mode Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pair 1 TOTALASSETS_A 25,846.895 111.020 35,407.879 7,081.576 
TOTALASSETS_B 21,801.927 95.660 33,385.389 6,677.078 
   DIFFERENCES 4,044.967 15.360     
Pair 2 ROA_A 9.066 1.100 6.653 1.331 
ROA_B 8.287 -4.370 8.025 1.605 
   DIFFERENCES 0.779 5.470     
Pair 3 ROE_A 13.928 2.450 7.850 1.570 
ROE_B 12.965 -16.060 13.395 2.679 
   DIFFERENCES 0.963 18.510     
Pair 4 NETPROFIT_A 553.770 2.830 539.015 107.803 
NETPROFIT_B 351.664 -2,015.000 900.807 180.161 
   DIFFERENCES 202.105 2,017.830     
Pair 5 PROFITMARGIN_A 10.760 1.655 7.271 1.454 
PROFITMARGIN_B 9.087 -6.385 6.623 1.325 
   DIFFERENCES 1.673 8.040     
Pair 6 OPERATINGMARGIN_A 17.242 3.630 10.165 2.033 
OPERATINGMARGIN_B 16.402 0.620 9.040 1.808 
   DIFFERENCES 0.840 3.010     
Pair 7 DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_A 28.216 0.000 15.621 3.124 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_B 32.241 0.000 17.378 3.476 
   DIFFERENCES -4.025 0.000     
Pair 8 FINANCIALLEVERAGE_A 4.939 1.175 5.665 1.133 
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FINANCIALLEVERAGE_B 6.067 43.025 6.612 1.322 
   DIFFERENCES -1.127 -41.850     
Pair 9 SALES_A 12,617.018 36.245 16,513.221 3,302.644 
SALES_B 7,414.569 43.025 12,637.384 2,527.477 
DIFFERENCES 5,202.449 -6.780     
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
 
Table 8: Statistics (>50%) 
Paired Samples Statistics 
  Mean Mode Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pair 1 TOTALASSETS_A 102,379.777 53.325 375,960.308 69,814.077 
TOTALASSETS_B 94,552.673 44.465 389,406.299 72,310.934 
   DIFFERENCES 7,827.104 8.860     
Pair 2 ROA_A 14.143 -0.070 19.109 3.548 
ROA_B 11.791 5.880 14.882 2.764 
   DIFFERENCES 2.352 -5.950     
Pair 3 ROE_A 18.229 -2.735 18.530 3.441 
ROE_B 17.727 -27.455 21.445 3.982 
   DIFFERENCES 0.501 24.720     
Pair 4 NETPROFIT_A 12,35.874 -152.500 1,613.442 299.609 
NETPROFIT_B 11,98.843 -168.495 1,708.426 317.247 
   DIFFERENCES 37.030 15.995     
Pair 5 PROFITMARGIN_A 9.543 -0.270 7.933 1.473 
PROFITMARGIN_B 8.416 -16.315 9.678 1.797 
   DIFFERENCES 1.127 16.045     
Pair 6 OPERATINGMARGIN_A 14.520 2.085 10.080 1.872 
OPERATINGMARGIN_B 13.339 -3.085 11.625 2.159 
 
Firms’ performance pre and post privatization  28 
   DIFFERENCES 1.181 5.170     
Pair 7 DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_A 25.239 0.195 16.114 2.992 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_B 26.339 0.245 17.107 3.177 
   DIFFERENCES -1.100 -0.050     
Pair 8 FINANCIALLEVERAGE_A 5.177 1.405 7.788 1.446 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_B 5.848 1.370 10.451 1.941 
   DIFFERENCES -0.671 0.035     
Pair 9 SALES_A 14,147.556 252.533 22,297.274 4,140.500 
SALES_B 14,840.445 29.505 18,689.165 3,470.491 
DIFFERENCES -692.890 223.028     
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
 Comparing table 7 and table 8, it is shown that the figures are improved after 
the privatization process.  But overall the differences of each variable are highly 
differentiated in each data set.  So far, it is not safe to be drawn any conclusion.  
 
 
 
Table 9: Paired Samples t-test 
Paired Samples Test 
 – Paired Differences t df p-value (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error                
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 TOTALASSETS_A - 
TOTALASSETS_B 
6076.115 23453.409 3191.605 -325.434 12477.663 1.904 53.000 0.062 
Pair 2 ROA_A - ROA_B 1.624 7.227 0.983 -0.349 3.596 1.651 53.000 0.105 
Pair 3 ROE_A - ROE_B 0.715 13.436 1.828 -2.952 4.382 0.391 53.000 0.697 
Pair 4 NETPROFIT_A - 
NETPROFIT_B 
113.454 1030.898 140.288 -167.927 394.835 0.809 53.000 0.422 
Pair 5 PROFITMARGIN_A - 
PROFITMARGIN_B 
1.380 5.980 0.814 -0.252 3.012 1.696 53.000 0.096 
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Pair 6 OPERATINGMARGIN_A - 
OPERATINGMARGIN_B 
1.023 6.041 0.822 -0.626 2.672 1.245 53.000 0.219 
Pair 7 DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_A 
- 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_B 
-2.454 11.934 1.624 -5.711 0.803 -1.511 53.000 0.137 
Pair 8 FINANCIALLEVERAGE_A 
- 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_B 
-0.882 2.936 0.400 -1.684 -0.081 -2.209 53.000 0.032 
Pair 9 SALES_A - SALES_B 2,036.434 17,311.732 2,355.828 -2,688.759 6,761.627 0.864 53.000 0.391 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
 
   
Table 9 summarizes the findings concerning the t-test conducted for the 
paired samples. The paired test is useful for the comparison of the exact same 
populations, on different time periods. It is not used the independent samples t-test, 
as it presupposes the existence of different populations, which is not the case here.  
The t-test is based on accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis H0 stands for finding no difference in the means for the two samples. On 
the contrary, the alternative hypothesis HA stands for finding difference in the two 
means. For the implementation of the test the level of significance alpha must be 
defined, which will be necessary for accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. In the 
literature, the common values of the alpha are 1%, 5% and 10%. It is chosen the use 
of a=5%. 
After performing the test, the 2-tailed p-values for every group of variables 
are tested. 2-tailed means that the analysis is focused on both the tails of the normal 
distribution. In this case the alpha value is divided by two for the two tails. As a 
result, it is defined a level of significance of 0.25 for every tail.  
When p-values are lower than a=0.05, that means that the null hypothesis is 
rejected or in other words that there exists a statistically significant difference in the 
means of the two data sets. When p-values are greater than a=0.05, the null 
hypothesis is accepted it is conclude that there is no difference in the two means and 
the difference noted is not statistically significant.  
The results of the test are very informative. As far as the total asset variable 
is concerned, there is a significant difference in the means (6076.115) and deviations 
(23453.409). That means that the total assets of the companies for the period after 
the privatization are much higher than the total assets reported before the 
privatization. Also the p-value is 0.062 which is higher than alpha (=0.05). As a result, 
it is concluded that there is no statistically significant difference between the total 
assets in the pre and post-privatization period. The difference between the means 
appear to have happed by chance.   
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The results are similar for most of the variables. Total assets, ROA, ROE, net 
profit, profit margin, operation margin, debt to total assets and sales have all p-
values greater than 0.05. Consequently, the differences of means did not happen 
due to an existing relation between the samples. Even though the variables took 
values that were expected and in favour of the privatization process applied to the 
companies analyzed, they should not be misinterpreted.  
The situation however is not the same for the financial leverage. The 
difference of -0.882 and the deviation of 2.963 cannot be ignored since the p-value 
of 0.032 is below 0.05. In this case it is safe to conclude that the difference in means 
between the pre and post-privatization period was caused by the ownership 
transformation that had taken place.  
 
 
Table  10:  Paired Samples t-test (<50%) 
Paired Samples Tests 
  Paired Differences t df p-value 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 TOTALASSETS_A - TOTALASSETS_B 
 
4,044.967 9,217.800 1,843.560 240.046 7,849.888 2.194 24.000 0.038 
Pair 2 ROA_A - ROA_B 
 
0.779 6.110 1.222 -1.743 3.301 0.638 24.000 0.530 
Pair 3 ROE_A - ROE_B 
 
0.963 13.623 2.725 -4.661 6.586 0.353 24.000 0.727 
Pair 4 NETPROFIT_A - NETPROFIT_B 
 
202.105 950.165 190.033 -190.104 594.314 1.064 24.000 0.298 
Pair 5 PROFITMARGIN_A - 
PROFITMARGIN_B 
 
1.673 5.791 1.158 -0.717 4.063 1.445 24.000 0.161 
Pair 6 OPERATINGMARGIN_A - 
OPERATINGMARGIN_B 
 
0.840 5.866 1.173 -1.581 3.261 0.716 24.000 0.481 
Pair 7 DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_A - 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_B 
 
-4.025 14.236 2.847 -9.901 1.851 -1.414 24.000 0.170 
Pair 8 FINANCIALLEVERAGE_A - 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_B 
 
-1.127 2.406 0.481 -2.121 -0.134 -2.343 24.000 0.028 
Pair 9 SALES_A - SALES_B 5,202.449 16,820.956 3,364.191 -1,740.900 12,145.799 1.546 24.000 0.135 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
Table 10 refers to the privatized companies with privatization level below or 
equal to 50%. The results of the test indicate that there are two variables with two 
tailed p-values below 0.05, and the rest of them are above 0.05. ROA, ROE, net 
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profit, profit margin, operation margin, debt to total assets and sales have all p- 
values greater than 0.05. As a result, the differences of means did not happen due to 
an existing relation between the samples, meaning the low level privatized 
companies compared for the pre and post-privatization period. 
On the contrary, total assets and financial leverage take 2 tailed p-values of 
0.038 and 0.028 respectively. The fact that they are below the level of alpha value, 
make it safe to conclude that the difference in means between the pre and post-
privatization period was caused by the ownership transformation.  
 
 
Table 11: Paired Samples t-test (>50%) 
Paired Samples Testa 
  Paired Differences t df p-value 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 TOTALASSETS_A - TOTALASSETS_B 
 
7827.104 31008.079 5758.056 -3967.739 19621.946 1.359 28.000 0.185 
Pair 2 ROA_A - ROA_B 
 
2.352 8.104 1.505 -0.730 5.435 1.563 28.000 0.129 
Pair 3 ROE_A - ROE_B 
 
0.501 13.510 2.509 -4.638 5.640 0.200 28.000 0.843 
Pair 4 NETPROFIT_A - NETPROFIT_B 
 
37.030 1106.675 205.504 -383.927 457.987 0.180 28.000 0.858 
Pair 5 PROFITMARGIN_A - 
PROFITMARGIN_B 
 
1.127 6.229 1.157 -1.242 3.497 0.975 28.000 0.338 
Pair 6 OPERATINGMARGIN_A - 
OPERATINGMARGIN_B 
 
1.181 6.288 1.168 -1.211 3.573 1.012 28.000 0.320 
Pair 7 DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_A - 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS_B 
 
-1.100 9.579 1.779 -4.744 2.544 -0.618 28.000 0.541 
Pair 8 FINANCIALLEVERAGE_A - 
FINANCIALLEVERAGE_B 
 
-0.671 3.355 0.623 -1.947 0.605 -1.077 28.000 0.291 
Pair 9 SALES_A - SALES_B 
 
-692.890 17552.578 3259.432 -7369.533 5983.754 -0.213 28.000 0.833 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
 
Table 11 refers to the privatized companies with privatization level above 
50%. All the variables take p-values above 0.05 meaning, the differences of means 
did not happen due to an existing relation between the samples, and they were all a 
matter of chance. The ownership transformation did not affect them in the pre and 
post privatization period.  
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The t-test is a parametric test. That means that the normal distribution is 
taken for granted. Unfortunately, this underlying assumption many times was 
mistaken. To overcome that obstacle it is conducted a Wilcoxon non-parametric test. 
The test has the same rationale as the t-test: two samples in two different time 
periods are compared, but it is not assumed that normally distribution is present. 
Moreover, another advantage of nonparametric tests, like Wilcoxon test, is that a 
small size of the sample does not affect the quality of the results. 
The Wilcoxon test is conducted by using the medians of the two samples. In 
this particular case, the medians and the means of the two data sets are the same. 
This happens because the number of the years of each period is even and it is just 2 
years long. As a result, the data analyzed happen to be the same.  
 After completing the calculations of the test, the p-value for every 
pair of variables is examined. The p-value will again be compared to the alpha level 
of significance. Again, alpha will be equal to 5%. The null hypothesis H0 stands for no 
difference in the medians before and after privatization and the HA stands for the 
opposite. If the p-value is greater than alpha, then the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Otherwise, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
 
Table 12: Wilcoxon test 
Test 
Statistics
a
 
         
  TOTALA
SSETS_
B - 
TOTALA
SSETS_
A 
ROA_B - 
ROA_A 
ROE_B - 
ROE_A 
NETPROFIT_B - 
NETPROFIT_A 
PROFITMARGIN
_B - 
PROFITMARGIN
_A 
OPERATING
MARGIN_B - 
OPERATING
MARGIN_A 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS
_B - 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS
_A 
FINANCIAL 
LEVERAGE_B 
– FINANCIA 
LLEVERAGE_
A 
SALES_B - 
SALES_A 
Z -3.913 -1.177 -0.517 -2.536 -1.304 -0.960 -0.977 -1.554 -1.063 
Asymp.  
P-value (2-
tailed) 
0.000 0.239 0.605 0.011 0.192 0.337 0.328 0.120 0.288 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
The last table presents the results of Wilcoxon test in a compact form. P- 
value of total assets is equal to zero and p-value of profit is 0.011. As a result, in both 
cases the p-value is below 0.05, it is concluded that the difference between the 
values before and after the privatization process did not happen by chance and the 
privatization was the cause.  On the contrary ROA, ROE, profit margin, operating 
margin, debt to total assets, financial leverage and sales, take p-values greater than 
0.05 and as a result it is concluded that the differences noted between the two 
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periods happened by chance. More formally only the p-values of total assets and net 
profit are statistically significant at a level of significance of a=0.05. 
 
Table 13: Wilcoxon test (<50%) 
Test 
Statistics
a
 
         
  TOTALA
SSETS_
B - 
TOTALA
SSETS_
A 
ROA_B - 
ROA_A 
ROE_B - 
ROE_A 
NETPROFIT_B - 
NETPROFIT_A 
PROFITMARGIN
_B - 
PROFITMARGIN
_A 
OPERATING
MARGIN_B - 
OPERATING
MARGIN_A 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS
_B - 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS
_A 
FINANCIAL 
LEVERAGE_B 
– FINANCIA 
LLEVERAGE_
A 
SALES_B - 
SALES_A 
Z -2.623 -0.857 -0.915 -2.489 -1.197 -0.578 -1.278 -1.493 -1.251 
Asymp.  
P-value(2-
tailed) 
0.009 0.391 0.360 0.013 0.231 0.563 0.201 0.135 0.211 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
 
Table 13 presents the results of Wilcoxon test for the privatized companies 
below 50%. The p-value of total assets is 0.009 and the p-value of net profit variable 
is 0,013. So, in both cases the p-value is below 0.05, and it is concluded that the 
difference between the values before and after privatization did not happen by 
chance and the privatization was the cause.  On the contrary the rest of the p- values 
are higher than 0.05 and it is concluded that the differences noted between the two 
periods happened only by chance. It is apparent that the results for the subset are 
exactly the same as for the whole sample.   
 
Table 14: Wilcoxon test (>50%) 
Test 
Statistics
a
 
         
  TOTALA
SSETS_
B - 
TOTALA
SSETS_
A 
ROA_B - 
ROA_A 
ROE_B - 
ROE_A 
NETPROFIT_B - 
NETPROFIT_A 
PROFITMARGIN
_B - 
PROFITMARGIN
_A 
OPERATING
MARGIN_B - 
OPERATING
MARGIN_A 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS
_B - 
DEBTTOTOTALASSETS
_A 
FINANCIAL 
LEVERAGE_B 
– FINANCIA 
LLEVERAGE_
A 
SALES_B - 
SALES_A 
Z -2.757 -0.995 -0.032 -1.330 -0.638 -0.724 -0.054 -0.746 -0.400 
Asymp.  
P-value 
(2-tailed) 
0.006 0.320 0.974 0.184 0.524 0.469 0.957 0.456 0.689 
A: After privatization period 
B: Before privatization period 
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Table 14 presents the results of the Wilcoxon test for the companies with 
privatization level more than 50%. The p-value of total assets is 0.006, so the p-value 
is below 0.05, and it is concluded that the difference between the values before and 
after the privatization did not happen by chance and the privatization was the cause.  
On the contrary the rest of the p-values take values greater than 0.05 and it is 
concluded that the differences noted between the two periods happened by chance. 
The main difference between the two subsets is that net profit plays a different role, 
as in the first case its value is below the alpha value, and in the second one it is 
above alpha.   
Even though in the two tests conducted the majority of the indicators seem 
to improve after the privatization process, which is a finding that is consistent with 
Ariff et al. (2009) and D’sousa and Megginson (1999), on the contrary differences 
observed are not statistically significant. This result is consistent with, García and 
Ansón, (2007) who found that the post privatization period do not suggest significant 
improvements in privatized companies’ profitability for a small term horizon. 
Probably, a potential justification for this outcome is the time horizon that the 
analysis is conducted. For example, newly privatized companies may require more 
than two years to be reorganized, to improve their financial condition and to be 
more competitive from their counterparts. 
Also, preceding studies conclude that privatization itself and the time horizon 
of the analysis are not the only reasons of change in the privatized firms' 
performance. As stated in the literature review, Donghui, et al. (2007) explain that 
performance increase with managerial ownership. Frydman et al. (1999) suggest that 
privatization has diverse effects that depend on the types of the owners. Hsueh-liang 
Wu and Parker (2009) found that competition improves financial performance. Dinic 
and Gupta (2011) clarify that post privatization performance is closely related with 
political factors and finally; Boubakri and Hamza (2007) argue that the initial legal 
environment is a significant factor for the development of a stock market and the 
privatization reforms.  
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Section 7 
 
Discussion of findings 
 
In this analysis it is conducted both the t-student test and the Wilcoxon test 
to spot the differences between the values of the variables chosen in the pre and 
post-privatization period. All variables followed a route that was predicted according 
to the initial hypothesis. Although in many cases the findings seem to get better the 
results do not suggest that privatization is the main cause of that enhanced financial 
performance.  
According to the t-test performed, only financial leverage is statistically 
related to the privatization process. Although the results for the remaining variables 
improve for the two years after privatization process the increase is not statistically 
significant. If the existence of the normal distribution was not an assumption, which 
was not by applying the Wilcoxon test, the privatization again appears to be 
insufficient as a cause to justify the differences in the values of the variables. Only 
total assets and net profit are statistically significant, and directly related to the 
privatization.   After dividing the sample into two groups and reproducing the tests, it 
is found that total assets in the sample consisted of the companies with level of 
privatization below or equal to 50%, is statistically related to the privatization 
process, which is not the case for the sample consisted of companies with 
privatization level above 50%. As a matter of fact, none of the variables was found to 
be affected substantially by the change in ownership structure, in the second 
sample. Concerning the Wilcoxon test for the two subsets, it can be spotted one 
main difference; the companies with privatization level above 50% do not get a value 
of high statistical significance for net profit variable, as it is the case for companies 
with privatization level below 50% or the whole sample. On the contrary there is a 
significant increase for profitability and output and decrease for financial leverage. 
Consistent with prior studies the results suggest that there is an improvement on 
profitability, output and financial leverage of companies after the privatization 
process.  
Furthermore, from literature review it is concluded that a government’s 
decision to privatize involves forecasting and scheduling of the privatization 
programme as well as reorganization of the newly privatized company. Also, it 
involves the appropriate political and legal environment for the conclusion of such a 
programme. At this point, there are additional queries that arise. For instance, it 
could be further examined how the political intentions of the government can 
influence the privatization process, how a country’s level of institutional 
development affects its decision to privatize and what will be the implications of 
privatization on employment.   
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